The environmental nation state in decline by Mol, Arthur P.J.
 
The environmental nation state in decline 
Mol, A. P. J. 
 
This article is made publically available in the institutional repository of Wageningen 
University and Research, under article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, also known 
as the Amendment Taverne. 
Article 25fa states that the author of a short scientific work funded either wholly or 
partially by Dutch public funds is entitled to make that work publicly available for no 
consideration following a reasonable period of time after the work was first 
published, provided that clear reference is made to the source of the first publication 
of the work. 
For questions regarding the public availability of this article, please contact 
openscience.library@wur.nl. 
Please cite this publication as follows: 
Mol, A. P. J. (2016). The environmental nation state in decline. Environmental 
Politics, 25(1), 48-68. DOI: 10.1080/09644016.2015.1074385 
You can download the published version at: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2015.1074385 
The environmental nation state in decline
Arthur P.J. Mol*
Environmental Policy group, Wageningen University, The Netherlands
The environmental nation state is not a formal category but a substantive
one. The current set of national environmental state institutions originated in
the late 1960s/1970s but has since changed in character. Many scholars note
that since the new millennium, the environmental nation state in OECD
countries is losing power and authority and is thus in decline, in line with
wider concerns about the positions of states versus markets under conditions
of (neo-liberal) globalisation. Assessing the decline of environmental nation
state authority, three conclusions are drawn. States do not lose power in all
sectors vis-à-vis markets. Hence, environmental nation state decline does not
follow a general tendency. Second, the decline of environmental nation state
powers cannot be equated with less effective or lower levels of environ-
mental protection, as other environmental authorities have stepped in, and
the jury is still out on their environmental effectiveness. Third, declining
powers of environmental nation state institutions increasingly become a self-
fulfilling prophecy of environmental policymakers, but non-state environ-
mental authorities cannot take over all environmental state functions.
Keywords: state capacity; state authority; private governance;
environmental performance; globalisation
Introduction
There is wide concern and criticism among environmental advocates regarding
the poor successes, declining capacity and power, and waning priorities of nation
state authorities in coping with current local and global environmental problems.
According to these advocates, environmental state agencies and ministries are
proving increasingly unable to develop, implement, and improve policies, plans,
and measures that redirect societal and economic developments towards sustain-
ability. This concern and criticism is more than the usual qualifications of
environmental advocates who never consider the grass green enough and/or
strategically operate an apocalyptic horizon of failing environmental states to
move public opinion. Quite a number of environmental social scientists have
joined this assessment of decreasing capacity and powers of environmental
nation state authorities (e.g. Falkner 2003, Arnouts and Arts 2009, Anthoff and
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Hahn 2010, Kraft and Vig 2010), although their analyses and assessments of
causes and consequences vary. Many scholars imply that decreasing environ-
mental state capacity and power affect environmental protection levels, reiterat-
ing the importance of state institutions for delivery of public goods. Others have
noted that the environmental state is not the only set of organisations and
institutions with authority to deal with environmental burdens (e.g. Spaargaren
and Mol 2008).
The claim of weakening or incapable environmental nation state institutions
seems to be part of wider concerns with the ‘infrastructural power’ (Mann 1984)
of states and the changing position of states versus markets in the new millen-
nium. Some scholars claim that under neo-liberal globalisation, the strengthening
of the power and influence of (global) market institutions came together with, at
best, the stagnating and even often-declining capacity, reach, and powers of state
institutions. However, that conclusion is not evident in respect of all agendas, as
the recent regaining by political institutions of influence and powers over global
financial markets proves.1 Under neo-liberal globalisation, some state agendas
seem to be more affected then others. Against this background, I focus here on
two questions. Is there in fact a stagnating or even waning role, capacity, and
power of environmental state authorities in OECD countries? Moreover, what
would a decline of the environmental authority of nation state institutions mean
for environmental problem solving? Hence, I aim here to qualify the weakening
of the nation state environmental authority and assess what this means for
managing prevailing environmental burdens. In the next section, I analyse the
(historical) emergence and development of environmental state institutions
before analysing why this state decline is specific to the environment. I then
evaluate the idea that this state decline affects environmental performance.
Finally, I discuss how we should normatively assess ‘shrinking’ environmental
nation state powers.
I end this introduction with a short note on concepts and delineation. In
analysing what has happened with state authority in coping with environmental
agendas, I will use the concept ‘environmental state’ in a rather analytical (and
non-normative) way (cf. Mol and Buttel 2002), akin to the concept of ‘ecological
state’ or ‘ecostate’ (cf. Meadowcroft 2005). The modern environmental state
refers to the set of governmental organisations, institutions, and practices (i.e.
what James Meadowcroft refers to as ‘structures and arrangements’) that have
been developed and installed over a five-decade period to cope with the modern
environmental burdens that have emerged on public and political agendas since
the 1960s, initially in OECD countries and later more globally. This set of state
organisations, institutions, and practices differs in form, size, outlook, and
functioning according to time and place. Hence, the environmental state is not
an ahistorical formal category, but rather a substantive one. In its modern form
(on which I will concentrate), it developed in the 1960s and 1970s in the OECD
countries, spread to wider geographies in the following two decades, and chan-
ged in character. We will have to see – and will start analysing here – how long it
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will last, where, and with what prospects. My core focus is on national state
institutions in OECD countries.
Environmental nation state decline
The idea of environmental nation state stagnation and decline can only be
understood with a historical perspective. Roughly speaking, the environmental
state in the OECD countries has gone through at least four phases. In these
different historical phases, the outlook and configuration of environmental state
institutions reflect the specifics of national historical contexts, policy styles,
environmental threats, and national economic and political developments, as
various historical and comparative studies of national environmental policy and
management have shown (e.g. Hays 1987, Ahuis 2004, Hillstrom and Hillstrom
2010, Steinberg and VanDeveer 2012). Whereas the phases have thus not devel-
oped exactly synchronously in all OECD countries, and national environmental
state prospects are ‘coloured’ by national circumstances, for the purpose of this
discussion I sketch the main tendencies and periods and neglect individual
particularities and outliers.
Rise and institutionalisation
Until the late 1950s/early 1960s, most developed states had installed only
marginal state organisations and institutions to cope with environmental destruc-
tion, often initially at local levels. Nature protection and nature conservation was
a main focal point since the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in
Europe, the USA, and Russia, and some national health-related organisations and
institutions were in place (e.g. on drinking water, urban waste collection and
dumping, workplace safety, and health). Alternatively, to put it in Samuel Hays
(1987) terminology, ‘beauty’ and ‘health’ received some state attention, but
‘permanence’ did not (yet). Most of the modern environmental threats related
to ‘permanence’, such as industrial and agricultural surface and ground water
pollution, air pollution, toxic chemicals, and soil pollution, as well as the more
international and global environmental threats, were left unaddressed.
The period from the 1960s until the early 1980s could be marked as the
era of establishment and institutionalisation of the modern environmental
nation state. Triggered by wide public protests and local and national envir-
onmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs), most OECD countries
constructed governmental environmental institutions and capacity in the form
of: national environmental laws and regulations; national governmental orga-
nisations (ministries, environmental protection agencies, and environmental
advisory councils); national environmental planning and policy instruments
such as Environmental Impact Assessments; environmental inspection, control,
and enforcement; and others (see Binder 2002, Busch et al. 2005). These state
institutions and organisations were constructed most visibly at the nation state
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level, but often had equivalents or operational arms at lower governmental
levels. The division of tasks and responsibilities between these governmental
levels differed by country, depending among others on culture, size, and state
form.
The 1980s can be seen as a decade of stagnation of environmental state
capacity building due to two interdependent reasons. First, the neo-liberalisation
debates and pressure, most strongly felt in the USA and the UK but with wider
outreach, hampered further building, expansion, and detailing of environmental
state capacity (McCormick 1991, Kraft and Vig 2010). Second, disappointment
with the results of environmental state institutions and organisations in mitigating
environmental devastations resulted in debates on environmental state failure
(e.g. Jänicke 1986) and reflections on the poor performance of a ‘nation state
strategy’ in addressing environmental infringements. Budgets, human resources,
new legislation, and policies stagnated and occasionally came under threat,
especially at the national level, marking a type of cap on two decades of rapid
environmental state expansion. However, although environmental deregulation
and privatisation were frequently mentioned and even planned in those years, in
retrospect, no overall shrinking or decline of environmental nation state institu-
tions and capacities can be identified in industrialised countries during the 1980s
(Collier 1997, Mol and Buttel 2002).
The 1990s, then, can best be marked as an era of environmental state
redefinition, reinvention, regained legitimation, and increased power and capa-
city in two ways. First, the environmental state became much further embedded
in and connected to wider segments of society and the economy. This expanded
scope manifested itself in new steering strategies and instruments (or governance
models) and in participation of non-state actors in all types of partnerships,
hybrid institutions, and participative governance models. These models, strate-
gies, and instruments meant a stronger embeddedness of environmental nation
state institutions in societies (including the economy), which further strengthened
(rather than weakened or undermined) the operational arms of the environmental
nation state. Concepts of regulatory reinvention in the USA (Rosenbaum 2000,
Kraft and Vig 2010) or political modernisation in Europe (Jänicke 1993, Van
Tatenhove et al. 2000) capture this renovation of the environmental nation state.
Second, international and global environmental agendas emerged strongly, and
the environmental nation state became refortified and legitimised through addres-
sing international and global challenges via international cooperation.
International environmental treaties (UNEP 2012, p. 464), international environ-
mental summits, international environmental organisations and networks, and
international environmental programs and support mushroomed and further
expanded and legitimised the environmental nation state powers. Most of these
international actions were developed, monitored, funded, implemented, and
verified primarily or mainly through the international state system. Together,
these developments set aside debates and questions on the need, powers, ade-
quacy, and capacity of environmental nation state institutions and organisations
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in addressing environmental burdens, and arguably extended the age of the
Environmental Leviathan (Paehlke and Torgerson 1990).
Stagnation and decline
In the remainder of this article, I will further assess the fourth, current phase in
the development of the modern environmental nation state in OECD countries.
My thesis is that this phase should be labelled one of stagnation and relative
decline of the environmental nation state. In this phase, the power, capacity, and
impact of the environmental nation state in most OECD countries are stagnating
and, in particular countries, even declining. Alternatively, to put it in terms of
Knill et al. (2009), the density and intensity of environmental nation state
operations are affected. Density refers to the number of policies and interventions
of the environmental nation state institutions, intensity to the strictness/strin-
gency (or when subsidies are involved, generosity) of environmental nation state
interventions. Indicators or proxies that ‘measure’ such affected density and/or
intensity include, for instance, the following: state capacities in terms of number
of national staff and budgets at environmental state institutions; the output and
innovation of stringent environmental laws, of new, effective environmental
policy instruments, and of ambitious environmental plans; effective implementa-
tion of environmental state decisions; quality and efficiency of environmental
state administration; adequacy of nation state institutions in addressing new
environmental challenges; environmental Weberianness (Rauch and Evans
2000); and relative power of environmental state institutions vis-à-vis other
(nation-)state institutions and vis-à-vis major private parties. However, such
indicators/proxies are not easy to quantify and compare across time, and there
is little monitoring of such indicators and proxies.2
There is, of course, longitudinal data on environmental quality, emissions,
and performance of OECD countries, such as those compiled by the Yale
centre of Environmental Policy (Hsu et al. 2014), from the World Resources
Institute database, or from UNEP’s Global Environment Outlook data portal.
However, these longitudinal data sets cannot be related back to national state
capacity or state performance, as many other variables intervene. Other
studies have compiled comparative data sets that are related to state capacity,
but often these data were not collected longitudinally or were not collected
over a sufficiently long period (e.g. Weidner and Jänicke 2002, Esty and
Porter 2005, Jacob and Volkery 2006). There hardly exist longitudinal
national databases with indicators on environmental states covering the past
one-and-a-half decades or so. More-qualitative country case studies do exist
that interpret and assess environmental state capacities, often regarding spe-
cific environmental issue areas. I will present three longitudinal databases and
some qualitative country case studies to make a reasonable case for the thesis
of environmental nation state stagnation/decline in OECD countries, under the
current condition of an expanding environmental agenda.
52 A.P.J. Mol
Environmental capacities as measured by the number of staff of national
Ministries for the Environment and/or national environmental protection
agencies between the 1990s and early 2010s show some variation among
the different OECD countries (Table 1).3 A group of countries show stagna-
tion in staff numbers in national environmental authorities (the USA, Japan,
Finland, Sweden, Norway). Another group of countries show declining staff
numbers in national ministries but some increase in staff at executive
environmental agencies (Germany, Austria, New Zealand). A third group
of countries, including the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, Canada, and
Australia, experience (sharp) declines in number of staff at national envir-
onmental authorities (but not always at agencies). A second indicator docu-
ments public environmental expenditures. Between 1995 and 2012 in the
EU, public environmental expenditures as percentages of total government
expenditures and as percentage of GDP (since 2002) have been stagnating
or decreasing for most European OECD countries, with a single exception –
Sweden (European Commission/Eurostat 2011, Eurostat 2014). The USEPA
budget in constant dollars also stabilised between 1990 and 2008 (Kraft and
Vig 2010, p. 378).
The World Economic Forum has surveyed business leaders of different
countries over a number of years on the stringency of national environ-
mental regulation and the stringency of national environmental enforcement
(ranging from 1 = lax to 7 = stringent; e.g. WEF 2014, p. 56–57). Average
perceived levels of environmental regulatory and enforcement stringency for
OECD countries have stayed rather stable, whereas those of all countries
have increased between 2004/2005 and 2013/2014 (see Figure 1). OECD
countries with decreasing national staff capacity (see Table 1) have system-
atically a lower perceived environmental (regulation and enforcement) strin-
gency than do those OECD countries with stagnating environmental staff
capacity (on average a 0.4/0.5 difference over the years).
3.6
3.8
4
4.2
4.4
4.6
4.8
5
5.2
5.4
5.6
2004/2005 2006/2007 2009/2010 2011/2012 2013/2014
regulation stringency all
regulation stringency OECD
enforcement stringency all
enforcement stringency OECD
Figure 1. Company CEO perceptions of stringency of environmental regulation and
enforcement in OECD countries and all countries (scale 1 = lax, 7 = stringent). Source:
World Economic Forum database.
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Table 1. Number of staff of national Ministries of the Environment/Environmental
Protection Agencies in the 1990s and 2010s for selected OECD countries.
Country
Number of
staff 1990s
Number of staff
2010s Source
Australia* Declining Declining Annual reports of
ministries
Austria
– Ministry of Land,
Forest, Environment,
and Water (LFEW;
overall)
3577 (1995) 2540 (2013) Andersen and Liefferink
(1997, p. 89); website
UBA; Bundeskanzleramt
data
– Ministry of LFEW:
central office
940 (2003) 853 (2013)
– Federal Environmental
Agency UBA
200 (1995) 479 (2014)
Canada
– Environment Canada** ±10,000 (1991) 6973 (2010) Enros (2013); annual
Report on Plans and
Priorities EC
6400 (2014)
Denmark
– Danish Ministry of the
Environment (central)
138 (2002) 70 (2008) Andersen and Liefferink
(1997, p. 259); website
Danish EPA; OECD
Environmental
performance review
– Danish MoE, incl. 7
decentral. offices
3400 (1999) 2575 (2006)
– Danish EPA 450 (1996) 450 (2014)
Finland
– Ministry of the
Environment
295 (1994) 280 (2014) Andersen and Liefferink
(1997, p. 129); website
MoE
Germany
– Bundesministerium für
Umweltschutz,
Naturschutz, und
Reaktorsicherheit
>800 (1993) <700 (2013) Websites
Bundesministerium and
UBA
– Federal Environmental
Agency UBA
1000 (2004) 1500 (2014)
Japan
– Ministry for the
Environment
1230 (2001) 1200 (2013) AECEN website; Barrett
(2005, p. 31)
Netherlands
– Directorate-General for
the Environment DGM
1000 (early
1990s)
300 (2014) Personal information
Norway
– Ministry of the
Environment
270 (1994) 260 (2014) Andersen and Liefferink
(1997, p. 327); websites
ministry and Pollution
Control authority
– Pollution Control
Agency
238 (1994) 325 (2014)
(continued )
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In addition to the limited quantitative evidence, there are many qualitative
studies that support the observation of environmental nation state institutions in
stagnation or decline. Writing on subjects such as neo-liberalising nature (e.g.
Castree 2008), policy/governance failure on the environment (e.g. Mercer et al.
2007, Helm 2010), environmental deregulation and privatisation (e.g. Mert
2012), and the hollowing out of the state (e.g. Aldred 2012), numerous authors
have identified and analysed the declining authority of central state institutions in
handling environmental problems. In these case studies and qualitative evidence,
some OECD countries figure more prominently with declining environmental
state authorities (Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, the USA, the UK lately,
Denmark, Italy) than others (Germany, Sweden, New Zealand). Additionally,
from the case studies, nation state decline and failure seem especially pertinent
for the new environmental agendas that emerged in the 1990s and later. The low
capacity, authority, and performance of environmental nation state institutions in
addressing these new environmental agendas are related to a failure to take up
these environmental protection tasks effectively in the first place. Climate
change, biodiversity loss, pollution of the oceans, overfishing of the oceans,
illegal trade in waste, and protection of the polar regions are a few of the more
Table 1. (Continued).
Country
Number of
staff 1990s
Number of staff
2010s Source
New Zealand
– Ministry for the
Environment
115 (1991) 330 (2009) Website Ministry for the
Environment270 (2013)
Sweden
– Ministry of
Environment and
Natural Resources
150 (1996) 168 (2013) Andersen and Liefferink
(1997, p. 51): SEPA
website; Government
Offices Yearbook– Swedish EPA 500 (1996) 530 (2014)
UK
– DEFRA 7000 (2002) 2100 (2014) UK government website
– Environment Agency 10,500 (2001) 13,181 (2010)
10,600 (2014)
USA
– USEPA 17,910 (1995) 18,740 (2010) Census data
Note: Some countries provide numbers in full-time equivalents and others in head count, making
numbers between countries not directly comparable. Two moments in time are presented, which has
the danger of non-representative data for a larger period. I have checked this for current 2013/2014
data (see also http://epanet.ew.eea.europa.eu/european_epas) but often was not able to do that for data
in the 1990s.
*The Ministry has changed name and composition repeatedly. The environmental staff number of the
Australian Capital Territory has been declining since 1998, with the exception of fiscal year 2005/
2006.
**Numbers decreased sharply until the late 1990s to below 5000, increased to 7000 in 2010, and then
decreased again.
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recent environmental challenges for which national state institutions have proved
not to be the key regulators. In other words, central state institutions have not
successfully developed or implemented (new) approaches, strategies, capacities,
and instruments to address these challenges. Here, stagnating or regressing
nation state capacity is not the conscious and deliberate relocation of environ-
mental capacity and responsibilities to other public and private environmental
authorities for reasons of efficiency, effectiveness, and institutional fit, as is
occasionally claimed for issues such as waste collection or drinking water
provisioning (see below).
Explaining stagnation/decline of the environmental nation state
There seems to be a prevailing opinion that, under contemporary globalisation
and neo-liberalisation, states lose power to economic institutions and actors.
Since the 1990s, many claim that private market authority is gaining ground
vis-à-vis public authority (e.g. Ohmae 1995, Strange 1996, Cutler et al. 1999,
Beck 2005). However, the idea of an overall diminishing public authority of the
nation state needs to be balanced. Elsewhere, scholars have argued convincingly
that economic globalisation:
● results not in the overall decline of the state, but rather in a partial
replacement of state authority by private market authority (Sassen 2006);
● goes together with denationalising of state capacities and growing influence
of political authorities beneath and beyond the national state (Beck 2005);
● leads to major internal transformations in nation state authority, as some
state sectors (e.g. the presidency, the treasurer, some executive branches)
become strengthened and others become weaker (representative institutions,
regulatory and legislative branches, environmental and other agencies); and
● does not equal poor protection of public goods, as market and moral
authorities can successfully step in (e.g. Pattberg 2007, Spaargaren and
Mol 2008).
The 2007/2008 financial crisis in the USA and later in Europe – and the crucial
role of nation states, national central banks, and EU institutions in containing that crisis
and restoring some control and regulatory oversight over private financial institutions
– contributed to the notion of a ‘return of the nation state’. However, signs of nation
state institutions (re)gaining ground seem absent from the environmental arena. There
seem to be few serious attempts and actions to enhance substantially the power,
capacity, and authority of environmental nation states in OECD countries.
The exception of the environmental nation state
Therefore, whereas economic globalisation does not automatically result in an
overall stagnation or decline of nation state/public authority and capacity, in
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many OECD countries, the environmental nation state – the set of national state
environmental organisations and institutions – has failed to increase power and
capacity over approximately the last decade and a half. Four arguments can help
to understand this stagnation/decline of, in particular, national environmental
state institutions (i.e. vis-à-vis national state institutions in other sectors/branches,
vis-à-vis state institutions at sub- and supranational levels, and vis-à-vis non-state
environmental institutions). It is understood that not every reason has equal
explanatory power for every nation state.
First, and following the idea of sustainable development, one of the new
strategies of the 1980s to cope with state failures was what has been labelled
external integration: the idea (and practice) that environmental infringements
could only be addressed successfully when sectoral state agencies, institutions,
and policies (economic, finance, agriculture, industry) were integrated with
environmental ones (Jordan and Lenschow 2010). The previously relatively
autonomous/separate environmental state institutions and organisations increas-
ingly started to share and mix tasks/responsibilities with sectoral (economic,
financial, agricultural, etc.) equivalents, or were even merged with those sectoral
equivalents into integrated institutions and organisations. During the heyday of
environmental concern in the 1990s, this worked well and gave state environ-
mental advocates significant influence to redesign/green other state institutions.
In particular, the influence of environmental state institutions and programs on
economic (sectoral) development, financial policies, foreign and international
cooperation policies, and energy policies significantly strengthened the environ-
mental agenda. When times changed and environment moved to the bottom of
the public and political agendas towards the end of the 1990s, some of these
integrated institutions concentrated again on their core, non-green functions.
Environmental policy integration is of course seldom a win–win process
and often has trade-offs: there may be real winners and losers (Lenschow
2002, p. 34). Alternatively, as Liberatore states, ‘the concept of integration
assumes a form of reciprocity’ (1997, p. 119). However, unless the different
components, in this case sectoral and environmental interests, have similar
weight and power, the output will not be a policy that is integrated with
respect to environmental aspects but instead a policy that dilutes environ-
mental interests. When environmental interests started losing power in the
national state bureaucracies and politics (in the late 1990s and beyond), state
environmental policymaking and implementation institutions became margin-
alised (Mol 2004). Integration proved then often a Trojan horse for the
environmental nation state. In the Netherlands, environmental integration
resulted in the merging in 2010 of two national ministries into the Ministry
for Infrastructure and Environment, with a Minister for Infrastructure and a
lower-level, less-powerful Secretary of State for Housing and Environment
(notice the sequence!). Additionally, in many countries, the greening of
economic policies in the 1990s turned into requirements that environmental
policies be economically sound in the 2000s. For Germany, Müller (2002)
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concluded that the Environment Ministry did not possess the institutional
standing in the government and the procedural tools to intervene in the
work of other ministries. Hey (2002) analysed the failure of environmental
taxation on heavy goods vehicles in Europe due to the power of financial
ministries. In contrast, in the UK integration of environment in other policy
domains from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s does not show this weakening
of the environmental state.
Second, international environmental cooperation and policy provided a major
legitimacy for and empowerment of environmental state institutions in the 1990s.
The Institutions for the Earth (Haas et al. 1993) were primarily institutions of
nation state collaboration. However, by the turn of the millennium, these state-
based institutions started to lose power, attractiveness, success, and thus legiti-
macy. The architecture of the international state system proved not (or no longer)
capable of handling the global environmental challenges we are confronted with,
not unlike how environmental nation states individually failed to cope with the
national environmental challenges in the 1980s. In the third millennium, new
models of global environmental collaboration were called upon and partly
emerged, ranging from new forms of global environmental state collaboration
and organisation via all types of hybrid institutions to non-state transnational
network institutions that go beyond and outside collaborating environmental
nation states.
Arguably, the problems with the entering into force of the Kyoto protocol and
with the negotiations of its successor are among the best illustrations. Advances
and innovations of global climate change policies are not so much made by
collaborating nation states within the framework of the UNFCCC but rather by
municipalities and mayors (Bouteligier 2013), private companies and market
parties, NGOs, and others. Two global financial crises enhanced state powers
and capacity in the financial sector to diminish and contain the role of the private
sector. However, until now, the global environmental crises did not ‘force’ larger
environmental nation state capacities; nor did they further ‘contain’ the drivers of
climate change.
Third, with globalisation, environmentally relevant practices (practices
causing environmental devastation as well as practices preserving the environ-
ment) are increasingly caused, governed, and determined by networks and
flows that criss-cross national borders and jurisdictions. Networks and flows
of transport and mobility, of energy and other natural resources, of products
and services, of pollution and waste, to name but a few, have become
architects of the contemporary environmental profile. As Spaargaren et al.
(2006) illustrated for different environmental issues, this prompts other envir-
onmental governance authorities than (collaborating) nation states. City net-
works, business networks, global production and supply networks, global
public–private partnerships, networks of labelling/certification that combine
market and moral authority, to name but a few, seem to be leading the
innovation in (global) environmental governance, as they have a structural
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affinity with the flow-and-network logic of current transnational environmen-
tal challenges. Nation state institutions are definitely actors in these new
governance networks that aim to manage environmental flows. However,
whereas in the 1980s and 1990s, environmental states managed to initiate,
coordinate, lead, determine access to, and influence multi-stakeholder govern-
ance arrangements within states and between states, they prove less able to do
so in the new millennium within transnational environmental governance
networks as described above. Hence, these new global governance networks
increasingly challenge conventional international environmental policymaking
and implementation, and environmental nation states lose a large part of their
positions as environmental governance network initiators, coordinators, gate-
keepers, and connectors.
These new networked environmental governance arrangements beyond the
nation state have been witnessed in the contexts of the sustainability regulation of
aquaculture and captured fish (Bush et al. 2013), wood (Tysiachniouk 2012),
biofuels (Mol 2010), organic agrofood (Glin et al. 2012), and other transnation-
ally traded products. Multi-stakeholder initiatives, global value chain govern-
ance, and private certification schemes dominate sustainability governance,
whereas (collaborating) nation states are playing a subsumed role or are even
absent.
Fourth and finally, the perception of environmental nation state decline is
also enhanced by the accountability structure in environmental politics. Under
current conditions of globalisation, environmental nation states are still the prime
institutions held accountable for environmental performance (especially in terms
of impacts) in their territories or within their jurisdiction by equivalent (state)
entities, by their domestic constituencies, and by globally operating non-state
actors (international organisations, multinational companies, NGO networks,
etc.). Even under current conditions, where – as indicated above – states have
lost a great deal of power over ruling, regulating, detailing, and prescribing
environmentally relevant activities within or related to their jurisdictions and
territories, environmental nation states are the prime institutions held accounta-
ble. This accountability-without-power severely undermines the legitimacy of the
environmental nation state through unfulfilled accountabilities of multiple types.
This contrasts with a number of new (i.e. non-state or hybrid) environmental
institutions that were (until now) not as strongly held accountable for environ-
mental performance. Additionally, if they are held accountable, it is rather in
respect of outputs (what they actually do in terms of new policies, initiatives,
instruments, strategies) and less so regarding the more troublesome outcomes
(e.g. changing behaviour of polluters) and impacts (e.g. lower emissions, better
environmental quality). Partnerships, hybrid institutions, roundtables, private
NGO–business coalitions, city networks, lead firms in global value chain, civil
society transparency institutions such as Transparency International or the
Carbon Disclosure Project, to name a few, are not necessarily more successful
in terms of environmental governance performance. However, as they lack the
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formalised and structured accountability mechanisms so characteristic of nation
state environmental institutions, they are less vulnerable to criticism for sub-
standard environmental performance.
Balancing environmental nation state stagnation and decline
This sobering portrait of the current environmental nation state should be
qualified on three accounts. First, this stagnating or even declining power and
capacity of the environmental nation state might be temporary, a specific phase in
the history of how states handle environmental damage. Not unlike the stagna-
tion in advancing and implementing the environmental agenda in the 1980s,
OECD countries may also now face a temporary setback in environmental state
building, followed by a new phase or reinvention. In other words, it remains to
be seen how permanent this environmental nation state setback is.
Second, this contemporary decline does not mean that environmental nation
state institutions have become irrelevant in absolute terms. Although Levy
(2010) hypothesises that, compared with social policy, there could be very
powerful votes for dismantling environmental policies as the desire to ‘claim
credit’ for deregulation outweighs the avoidance of blame, there exists little
empirical evidence of the existence of such a process. Decades of environmental
state institution building guarantee some inertia and continuity of the environ-
mental nation state. Even today, massive ‘environmental deinstitutionalisation’ –
the breaking down and dissolving of nation state environmental institutions (e.g.
Mol 2009) – or environmental policy dismantling (e.g. Korte and Jörgens 2012;
Jordan et al. 2013) is still a rare phenomenon, as also evidenced by the selective
environmental state capacity data presented above.
Third, declining capacity, interest/priority, and authority of the environmental
nation state institutions on environmental agendas and threats is not automati-
cally problematic for environmental sustainability. Some claim that centralised
environmental policymaking provides more stringent outcomes than decentra-
lised or cooperative forms (Weiburst 2009). Quite a number of ‘conventional’
local/national environmental threats emerged on the public and policy agendas in
the 1970s and have successfully been put under some type of (state) control in
OECD countries (e.g. safe drinking water, sewerage, acidification, solid waste,
point-source surface water pollution, food poisoning, and deforestation).
However, less nation state involvement does not mean less-effective problem
solving, control, and management. Other institutions and actors, within and
outside the environmental nation state, have taken over functions, tasks, capa-
cities, and responsibilities of national state institutions through decentralisation,
devolution, integration, privatisation, hybridisation, and internationalisation. As
Weidner and Jänicke (2002, see also Jacob and Volkery 2006) conceptualise,
national environmental capacity is more than nation state environmental capacity.
Some scholars note the continuing (indirect) power and effect of environmental
nation state institutions by claiming that these operate now in new governance
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arrangements (or partnerships such as green alliances) with other non-state actors
and institutions, and with sub- and supranational political bodies on environ-
mental protection (e.g. Conca 2005; Glasbergen et al. 2007). Environmental
awareness-raising can be and is handled through environmental NGOs; solid
waste collection and recycling is (partly) privatised to companies; environmental
enforcement runs (also) via value chains, insurance companies, and private
certification organisations; and environmental licensing and energy conservation
programs are decentralised to municipalities. Although the relocation of these
environmental tasks and responsibilities from nation state institutions to other
public and private environmental authorities often goes together with – more or
less fierce – debates about effectiveness, efficiency, and equity, the aim and often
end result of such relocation is not necessarily a lower level of environmental
protection, preservation, and performance. However, it is definitely a different
form of institutionalisation of environmental protection.
That is also why OECD countries do not show an overall environmental
deterioration, even though their nation state institutions seem to be losing
environmental authority. In analysing the environmental performance data of
OECD countries over the past two decades, most scholars agree that there has
been a lack of sufficient progress in mitigating environmental pollution (e.g.
greenhouse-gas emissions, pesticide use), resource efficiency and recycling (e.g.
phosphate, energy, rare earths), and environmental quality (air, oceans, soils),
either in total, per capita, or per unit of GDP. However, few can conclude that
there has been an overall environmental deterioration in these countries on most
indicators. The Environmental Performance Index of the Yale centre for environ-
mental Law and Policy, among others, does not show deteriorating environmen-
tal performances for the group of OECD countries over the past decade (http://
epi.yale.edu/). Institutionalisation of environmental capacity in other than nation
state institutions is part of the explanation.
In conclusion, the stagnation/decline of environmental nation states has
come together with a hybridisation (Conca 2005) and diversification
(Spaargaren and Mol 2008) of environmental authorities, both within the
system of states and outside it. These developments suggest that stagnation/
decline of environmental nation state institutions does not map directly to
apocalyptic horizons of failed environmental governance. Many other institu-
tions, both state and non-state, have shown their power and authority in
governing the environmental challenges of our time. In addition, many scho-
lars have illustrated the power and effects of these non–(nation) state envir-
onmental institutions in governing environmental problems. Obviously, these
alternative environmental institutions and authorities are not (yet) performing
according to desired sustainability standards. However, there is no reason or
historical ‘evidence’ to believe that a larger nation state environmental capa-
city would have done much better. This raises the question of whether we
should be worried at all about a stagnating or declining nation state environ-
mental capacity. As argued elsewhere (Mol 2007b) in different terms, I do
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think there are arguments to ‘bring the environmental state back in’, analy-
tically and normatively.
Bringing the environmental state back in
Now that other environmental authorities below, above, and outside the nation
state are increasing in importance, I conclude that it remains essential to bring the
environmental nation state back into the equation of environmental protection for
three reasons.
First, there is a strong double hermeneutics element in the analysis of
weakening environmental nation states and emerging new non-state authorities.
Social scientists have been conscious of double hermeneutics, that is, of the
fact that social science studies and writings influence research objects for better
or for worse. Increasingly, with the literature and studies on network
governance, private governance, governance without government, partnerships,
non-state-market-driven governance and others, environmental nation state orga-
nisations, and their officials/representatives appear increasingly to internalise
these ideas by: legitimising and prioritising non-interventionist state environ-
mental policies; showing a preoccupation with mediation and network construc-
tion instead of designing and implementing substantial and stringent
environmental policies; reducing the until recently strong core of environmental
experts and expertise within the environmental state while maximising the
numbers of managers, mediators, and communicators; and outsourcing nation
state tasks to subnational institutions and non-state parties. Shifts in environ-
mental authority become an excuse or argument for an absence of environmental
ambitions within national state environmental agencies, for a further weakening
of environmental state institutions, for non-interventionist policies, for endless
mediation and discussion, and for environmentally ineffective devolution and
privatisation. In other words, shifts in authority may then result in a self-fulfilling
prophecy of declining environmental state capacity. It is understood that specific
sectors in society and specific political ideologies cherish and celebrate such
developments, emphasising the impossibility of interventionist, preventive, and
precautionary national environmental policies. In contrast to the environmental
domain, there is little hesitation within state organisations and officials to be
interventionist and preventive when issues of terrorism, security, economic
stimulation, or financial crises are at stake.
Second, the environmental nation state needs to be foregrounded, as it is
not interchangeable with other (non-state) environmental authorities in all
respects. I do not want to argue that states have any pre-given higher morality,
normatively preferable place, or formal ahistorical position in environmental
protection arrangements. However, I do think that in contemporary environ-
mental governance, states and state authorities require a conceptualisation that
is fundamentally rather than marginally different (but not better) than those of
other (private) actors and authorities. Bringing the environmental state back in
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means making conceptual room for the specificities of states and state autho-
rities wherein environmental accountability, rule-altering behaviour, democ-
racy, and balancing interests cannot be handled adequately and/or legitimately
by non-state authorities. This is in line with Gerrefi et al. (2001, Mayer and
Gereffi 2010), who conclude that private partnerships should not weaken or
replace existing state programmes but should go together with a strong state
that actively enforces environmental goals within and beyond their sovereign
territory. Similarly, Seidman (2005) warns of the limitations of ‘stateless’
governance and for civil society replacing the state in taking up watchdog
and control functions traditionally fulfilled by the state. The question then
becomes: regarding what types of environmental issues, levels, and arrange-
ments can state ‘functions’, tasks, and responsibilities be (partly) taken over
by or mixed with other actors and authorities, and where do we witness (and
thus need) the unique qualities of nation states and state institutions? Without
claiming to provide a full and complete analysis, some essential environmental
nation state functions can be identified. Meadowcroft (2007) provides an
interesting start for such an analysis with respect to democracy, wherein he
argues for the essential meta-governance role of representative institutions.
Other nation state roles prove essential in handling environmental catastrophes
such as nuclear disasters (e.g. Fukushima in 2011), the global spread of bird
flu (2003/2004) or swine flu (2009), or major oil spills such as the Deep
Horizon (2010). States are also key to constructing, codifying, and maintain-
ing a level playing field in which environmental risk allocation is not
squeezed towards vulnerable minorities, whether on a local or global level.
Additionally, states are essential in preventing and punishing major criminal
behaviour related to the environment, such as illegal toxic waste dumping,
intentional food contamination (such as melamine in milk or glycol in wine),
and IUU (illegal, unreported and unregulated) fishing.
With this set of specificities of environmental nation states, we nonetheless
do not argue for (a return to) classical statist arrangements in environmental
governance, as some of the ‘simple modernity’ state advocates seem to do. Under
specific conditions, legitimacy, accountability, environmental effectiveness, inter-
est balancing, and democracy can also be organised and safeguarded to a major
extent through, for instance, global private authorities. However, in other cases,
this is not desirable or possible, or the (non-monetary) costs and external effects
would be too high. In those cases, environmental nation states and their demo-
cratic institutions should not withdraw into stagnation, mediation, facilitation,
network management, and information exchange with respect to solving global
environmental problems. Rather, in such cases, environmental states must be
foregrounded in taking the authoritative lead in actions against environmental
devastation.
Bringing the environmental state back in thus refers not only to an analytical
project (bringing the environmental state back into the analysis of environmental
governance) but also to a political project wherein environmental states, state
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organisations, and state officials dare to intervene and make a difference, and
also when uncertainties, globalisation, and complexities make simple planning
and causal goal-effect analysis out of the question. However – and this is my
third point – the outlook, operations and power employment of the environ-
mental state should be different compared with those of two decades ago.
Globalisation requires an outward-looking cosmopolitan state in a transnational
state system, not an inward-looking programme of narrow nationalist (environ-
mental) protectionism. Environmental nation states should not limit operations to
the ‘nation state container’, but should actively operate in, ‘program’, and
connect with (cf. Castells 2009) global networks where global environmental
flows are handled and managed. Nation states have started doing that to some
extent with respect to global financial flows and security and terrorism; they
should start doing similarly with respect to regulating environmental flows and
protection. Connecting and programming different global networks regulating
environmental flows cannot be left in the hands of private institutions alone.
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Notes
1. In the literature, three dimensions of state capacity are usually distinguished: coercive
capacity, extractive capacity (raising revenues), and administrative capacity (produ-
cing and delivering public goods and services and regulating economic activity;
Skocpol 1985, p. 16, Hanson and Sigman 2013). Environmental state capacity (but
also regulating financial markets) concerns mainly the latter dimension, although it is
dependent on extractive capacities.
2. There is growing work on indicators and databases for quantification of (adminis-
trative) state capacity (e.g. Hanson and Sigman 2013), but hardly on environmental
state capacity. Brunel and Levinson (2013) and Sauter (2014) have assessed various
existing and new conceptualisations to assess state environmental stringency, but
have not yet carried out systematic applications.
3. The number of staff could not be traced for all OECD countries. Occasionally,
ministries were reorganised – hence the later years (early 2000s) or absence of the
country. In some (federal) nation states, environmental protection is more a respon-
sibility of the states rather than the federal government.
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